Tokenomics

Anvil256 — Tokenomics

ANVL is a fixed-supply proof-of-work token on Base L2 with explicit protocol-owned liquidity (POL) accounting. The hard cap is $21{,}000{,}000$ ANVL. The launch has no dev premine, no presale, no VC tranche, no admin mint, and no withdraw function for the official Uniswap v3 LP NFTs.

It is not accurate to say that every emitted token goes to miners. The current contract mints a small genesis LP seed and then mints a 10% liquidity reserve alongside each miner reward. The honest identity is:

$$\mathrm{dev\ premine}=0,\qquad \mathrm{genesis\ LP\ seed}=1\ \mathrm{ANVL},\qquad \mathrm{LP\ emission}=0.1R(n)$$

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1. Contract Constants

Symbol	Value	Meaning
$S_{\max}$	$21{,}000{,}000$ ANVL	hard cap enforced by _update
$R_0$	$50$ ANVL	initial miner reward
$H$	$210{,}000$ epochs	halving interval
$K$	$64$	maximum halving intervals
$F$	\0.10$	per-mine protocol fee
$q_{dev}$	$50\%$	dev split of $F$
$q_{LP}$	$50\%$	ETH liquidity split of $F$
$\lambda$	$10\%$	LP token reserve minted per miner reward
$S_{seed}$	$1$ ANVL	genesis seed LP token amount
$E_{seed}$	$0.001$ ETH	genesis seed LP ETH amount
$B$	$50\%$	main LP deployment trigger

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2. Reward and Minting Function

The miner reward at epoch $n$ is:

$$R(n)= \begin{cases} R_0 \gg \lfloor n/H \rfloor, & \lfloor n/H \rfloor < K \\ 0, & \lfloor n/H \rfloor \ge K \end{cases}$$

For a normal mine before the supply cap boundary:

$$M_{miner}(n)=R(n)$$ $$M_{LP}(n)=\lambda R(n)=0.1R(n)$$ $$M_{total}(n)=R(n)+0.1R(n)=1.1R(n)$$

At epoch 0:

$$R(0)=50,\qquad M_{LP}(0)=5,\qquad M_{total}(0)=55\ \mathrm{ANVL}$$

The cap is still absolute:

$$totalSupply \le S_{\max}$$

If a mine would exceed $S_{\max}$, the contract truncates the miner reward first and then truncates the LP reserve mint if needed.

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3. Supply Identity With LP Reserve

The idealized geometric identity for miner-only rewards is:

$$\sum_{k=0}^{63} H R_0 2^{-k} \;=\; 2 H R_0 \cdot (1 - 2^{-64}) \;\approx\; 21{,}000{,}000\ \mathrm{ANVL}$$

Integer truncation note. The on-chain implementation uses integer right-shift (INITIAL_REWARD >> halvings). Due to floor truncation at each halving, the actual total mintable via the miner schedule is approximately $20{,}999{,}991$ ANVL — ${\sim}9$ ANVL below MAX_SUPPLY. MAX_SUPPLY is a hard ceiling; the ${\sim}9$ ANVL shortfall simply never gets minted. This is intentional and has no economic significance.

But the deployed contract also mints a 10% LP reserve alongside each miner reward. Therefore the practical cap is reached earlier than the pure miner-only schedule. Ignoring final right-shift dust and cap truncation, cumulative mint pressure is:

$$S_{pressure}\approx S_{seed}+1.1\sum_{k=0}^{63}H R_0 2^{-k}$$ $$S_{pressure}\approx 1 + 1.1\times 21{,}000{,}000 =23{,}100{,}001\ \mathrm{ANVL}$$

Because the actual cap is $21{,}000{,}000$, the schedule terminates by cap before the theoretical miner-only terminus. This is intentional: the LP reserve is inside the same hard cap, not inflation outside it.

Approximate full-cap mine count during the first reward band:

$$N_{cap}^{(band0)}=\left\lceil\frac{21{,}000{,}000-1}{55}\right\rceil =381{,}819\ \mathrm{mines}$$

This is a deliberately invalid single-band counterfactual: it assumes $R(n)=50$ forever. Because $381{,}819>210{,}000$, the first halving occurs before cap, so the exact termination requires summing the piecewise halving schedule with the $1.1$ multiplier and cap truncation.

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4. Fee Split Formula

Let $p$ be the Chainlink ETH/USD answer with 8 decimals:

$$p=p_{USD}\times 10^8$$

The required native ETH fee is:

$$fee_{wei}=\frac{100{,}000\times 10^{20}}{p}$$

At ETH =\2{,}500$:

$$p=2500\times 10^8=2.5\times 10^{11}$$ $$fee_{wei}=\frac{10^{25}}{2.5\times 10^{11}}=4\times 10^{13}\ \mathrm{wei}$$

The split is:

$$devFee=\frac{1}{2}fee=\$0.05$$ $$lpFee=\frac{1}{2}fee=\$0.05$$

devFee is transferred to the immutable feeRecipient. lpFee remains in the contract as lpReserveEthWei until protocol liquidity is deployed or dripped.

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5. Liquidity Bootstrap Mathematics

5.1 Genesis Seed

At deployment the constructor creates/reuses the ANVL/WETH Uniswap v3 pool and mints a tiny full-range seed position:

$$E_{seed}=0.001\ \mathrm{ETH},\qquad S_{seed}=1\ \mathrm{ANVL}$$

The seed ratio is:

$$P_{seed}=\frac{0.001}{1}=0.001\ \mathrm{ETH/ANVL}$$

If ETH =\2{,}500$:

$$P_{seed,USD}=0.001\times 2500=\$2.50/\mathrm{ANVL}$$

This seed is deliberately small — 10× smaller than earlier design drafts. It anchors an initial pool but should not be interpreted as a fair market price guarantee.

5.2 Main LP Trigger

Main protocol liquidity is not deposited every mine. It accumulates first:

$$LP_{ETH}(N)=0.05N\ \mathrm{USD\ equivalent}$$ $$LP_{ANVL}(N)=\sum_{n=0}^{N-1}0.1R(n)$$

Main deployment becomes permissionless when:

$$totalSupply \ge 0.5S_{\max}=10{,}500{,}000\ \mathrm{ANVL}$$

During the initial reward band, approximate trigger mine count is:

$$N_{50\%}\approx \left\lceil\frac{10{,}500{,}000-1}{55}\right\rceil =190{,}909\ \mathrm{mines}$$

At that point, approximate accumulated reserves are:

$$LP_{ETH}\approx 190{,}909\times \$0.05=\$9{,}545.45$$ $$LP_{ANVL}\approx 190{,}909\times 5=954{,}545\ \mathrm{ANVL}$$

The implied reserve ratio is:

$$P_{reserve}\approx \frac{9545.45}{954545}=\$0.01/\mathrm{ANVL}$$

This is a reserve accounting ratio, not a market-price promise.

5.3 Post-Trigger Drip

After deployLiquidityReserves() succeeds, future mines continue to accrue:

$$\Delta LP_{ETH}=\$0.05,\qquad \Delta LP_{ANVL}=0.1R(n)$$

Anyone can call dripLiquidityReserves() to add the newly accumulated reserve into the same official full-range LP position.

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6. Official LP Lock Semantics

The official Uniswap v3 LP NFTs are minted to the Anvil256 contract itself:

$$recipient=address(Anvil256)$$

The token contract exposes no function for:

• decreaseLiquidity
• collect
• NFT transfer
• ETH withdrawal
• ANVL reserve withdrawal
• owner rescue

Therefore the official LP is locked in the token contract by absence of an exit path. This is not the same as sending an NFT to a burn address, but it is a stronger operational statement than a time lock controlled by an admin.

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7. Miner Break-Even

Ignoring hardware electricity and L2 gas, the fee break-even price is:

$$P_{BE}(n)=\frac{\$0.10}{R(n)}$$

At epoch 0:

$$P_{BE}(0)=\frac{0.10}{50}=\$0.002/\mathrm{ANVL}$$

Including Base gas $g_{USD}$ and power cost per successful mine $e_{USD}$:

$$P_{BE}(n)=\frac{0.10+g_{USD}+e_{USD}}{R(n)}$$

No profitability is guaranteed. Mining is profitable only if market value of the miner reward exceeds the protocol fee, gas, and hardware cost.

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8. What Is Not Claimed

The protocol does not claim:

• that every ANVL goes directly to miners;
• that the seed LP price is fair market value;
• that mining is always profitable;
• that Chainlink cannot halt mining through stale data;
• that official LP fees can be collected;
• that the 50% trigger automatically executes without a caller.

The precise claim is narrower and stronger:

$$admin=\varnothing,\quad devPremine=0,\quad totalSupply\le 21{,}000{,}000, \quad officialLPWithdraw=\varnothing$$